The Least Restrictive Means
Alan 0. Sykest
Least restrictive means requirements and related legal principles,
which require regulators to pursue regulatory objectives in the manner that is "least restrictive" of other societal values, pervade national
and international legal systems.! In American constitutional law, they
appear in First Amendment cases, in Equal Protection cases, and in
Dormant Commerce Clause cases, among others. They perform similar functions in European Law, such as in the jurisprudence of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome. They may be found in a number
of articles of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and they play an essential role in the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Despite the extensive use of least restrictive means requirements
in the law, their meaning has rarely been explored with care. Precisely
how does one determine whether some regulatory policy is a less restrictive alternative (or not)? One class of cases seems clear-when
an alternative regulation unquestionably achieves a clearly stipulated
regulatory objective at equal or lower cost to regulators while imposing a lesser burden on some other valued interest (free speech, free
trade, or the like), the alternative is "less restrictive." But these conditions seem quite narrow, and the question arises whether a challenged
regulation will necessarily pass muster when they do not hold. A proposed alternative may be somewhat more costly to implement, for example, or slightly less effective at achieving the stated regulatory objective, yet still seem quite preferable if it is much less burdensome on
the interest that is protected by the least restrictive means requirement.
One wonders, therefore, whether a least restrictive means analysis will drift toward broader cost-benefit analysis. That is the central
question this Essay explores. The answer may well depend on context,
and in this short Essay I cannot explore the least restrictive means
test in all of its domestic and international manifestations. The analy" Frank & Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I thank Jessica Romero for her able research assistance.
I The term "least restrictive means" originated in American law, and equivalent legal
concepts often go by other labels elsewhere. Thus, European law and international trade agreements often invoke the "necessity" test instead-is the measure in question "necessary" to
achieve the government objective at issue, or can it be achieved in a less restrictive fashion? See
Part I.
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sis will thus focus on the area that I know the best, the law of the
WTO system. The objective is strictly a positive one-to understand
least restrictive means analysis as it is in fact employed within the
WTO, and not to comment on its wisdom.'
Although the WTO legal system is relatively young and the pertinent decisions are few, my claim is that least restrictive means analysis in the WTO to date is simply a crude cost-benefit analysis, constrained by an awareness of error costs and uncertainty. Regulations
that seem likely to be wasteful are more likely to be condemned under the least restrictive means test when the costs of erroneously condemning them are small, and when the costs of any reduction in compliance with the stated regulatory objectives are small. In this sense,
least restrictive means analysis in the WTO may be viewed as sensible
cost-benefit analysis under uncertainty.'
This emphasis differentiates the discussion here from previous work on the WTO, which
is almost exclusively normative and often embodies presuppositions about the way that least restrictive means tests will operate that are not entirely accurate, in part because WNTO jurisprudence in the area had not taken shape to any degree at the time of these earlier writings.
The following works address the role of least restrictive means tests in VTO law to some
degree: Robert Howse, Democracy, Science and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the
World Trade Organization,98 Mich L Rev 2329, 2353 (2000) (examining the least restrictive
means test in the context of the V/TO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures);
John 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv L Rev 511,
589-90, 594-96, 598-99 (2000) (arguing that member states "must make sure that the WTO applies the least restrictive means requirement with substantial deference to national regulatory
agendas"); Alan 0. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International
Goods and Services Markets, 2 J Intl Econ L 49, 64-65 (1999) (explaining the least restrictive
means requirement as part of a system of "policed decentralization"); Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory
Protectionism and the Law of InternationalTrade, 66 U Chi L Rev 1, 21-22 (1999) (explaining
the least restrictive means requirement and its role in reducing regulatory protectionism); Joel
Trachtman, Trade and... Problems,Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 Eur J Intl L 32, 6974 (1998) (comparing the "least trade restrictive alternative" test with other legal devices used
to address conflicts between trade values and other values); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91
Am J Intl L 268, 276-77, 312 (1997) (arguing that members of the WTO should amend Article
XX of the GATT 1994 to "remove the overly strict 'least trade restrictive' criterion" and allow
for "trade measures that are reasonably necessary for the protection of the domestic environment"); Alan 0. Sykes, ProductStandards for InternationallyIntegrated Goods Markets 118-28
(Brookings 1995) (describing the least restrictive means principle as "arguably more important
than any other" in the technical barriers agreements). In addition, the following papers touch on
the role of least restrictive means tests in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
predecessor to the V/TO: Daniel A. Farber and Robert Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory
State: A GATT's Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 Vand L Rev 1401, 1421-31
(1994) (comparing the operation of the least restrictive means test under the dormant Commerce Clause with its operation under GATF); and Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International
Trade with Preservationof the Global Commons: Can We Prosperand Protect?,49 Wash & Lee
L Rev 1407, 1448-50 (1992) (arguing that a least trade-restrictive requirement is not necessary
to properly limit the use of environmental regulations that restrict international trade).
3
The literature on cost-benefit analysis, both critical and favorable, is vast. For a window
into the issues, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,99 Mich L
Rev 1651, 1654-56 (2001) (discussing cost-benefit principles in regulatory policy); Matthew D.
Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 167, 167 (1999) (de2
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I. THE "LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS" IN GATT
AND WTO AGREEMENTS

Least restrictive means tests or the equivalent appear in multiple
places under WTO law. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATf) of 1947, which was subsumed within the new WTO system in
1995, embodies the basic reciprocal commitments to lower tariff barriers that lie at the heart of the WTO system. It also contains a number of other requirements, including limitations on quantitative restrictions and various nondiscrimination commitments. Article XX of
GATT, however, provides a list of "general exceptions," which a
member nation can invoke as an affirmative defense to a breach of
GAIT obligations. Article XX reads, in pertinent part:
[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health;... (d) necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Agreement.'
Through the years, GATT dispute panels had a number of occasions to interpret the term "necessary" in these exceptions. One panel
concerned with the exception in Article XX(d) found that:
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with
another GATT provision as "necessary" . . . if an alternative

measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it .... [I]n cases where a measure consistent with other

GAT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party
is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it,
that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other
GATT provisions.!
Subsequently, a panel concerned with Article XX(b) concluded
that the word "necessary" should have the same meaning there, and
held that the purpose of both exceptions is "to allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent with the
[GAIT] to pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that
fending use of cost-benefit analyses on cost and accuracy grounds); and the symposium
papers
collected in 29 J Legal Stud 843 (2000).
4 GATT is reprinted in John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and
Alan 0. Sykes, Documents
Supplement to Legal Problems of InternationalEconomic Relations 15-78 (West
4th ed 2002).
5 Id at 45.
6
United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930 1 5.26, 36th Supp GATT
BISD 345,
392-93 (1990) (concluding that Section 337 of the United States Tariff Act of
1930 is inconsistent with Article 11I:4 and Article XX(d) of GAT).
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7
such inconsistencies were unavoidable. Such inconsistent measures
could be considered to be necessary "only if there were no alternative
measure consistent with [GATT], or less inconsistent with it, which [a
party] could reasonably be expected to employ."" The requirement
for parties to use the "least inconsistent" measure reasonably available is, of course, just a linguistic variant of a least restrictive means
test.
The creation of the WTO in 1995 added a number of new treaty
texts that went beyond the original GATT on many issues. Some of
them borrow from the "necessity" test of GATT Article XX. The
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures addresses national regulatory policies aimed at the spread of diseases, pests, and disease-carrying organisms, as well those aimed at
controlling risk from "additives, contaminants or toxins" in foodstuffs.9 The Agreement requires WTO members to ensure that any
such measure "is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."'" Another provision goes on to
formulate a separate least restrictive means requirement: Members
must "ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than
required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility."11
The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which covers product regulations that fall outside the scope of the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, incorporates least restrictive
means requirements as well. For example, "technical regulations shall
not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate ob'
jective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create.""
Likewise, "[t]echnical regulations shall not be maintained if ...
changed circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less traderestrictive manner."' 3 Other examples of least restrictive means or
necessity requirements might be given, but these should suffice to

Thailand-Restrictionson Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes 74, 37th
Supp GAT[ BISD 200,223 (1991).
Id at 9175.
8
A,
9 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Annex
4).
11, reprinted in Jackson, Davey, and Sykes, Documents Supplement at 121-33 (cited in note
10 Id at Art 2.2.
11 Id at Art 5.6. The footnote to this provision states that "a measure is not more trade restrictive than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into account
technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade." Id at Art 5.6 n 3.
12 WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Art 2.2, reprinted in Jackson, Davey,
and Sykes, Documents Supplement at 150 (cited in note 4).
13 Id at Art 2.3.
7
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make the point that such requirements have evolved into important
constraints on the domestic regulations of WTO members.
II. THE LEAST RESTRICTIvE MEANS TEST IN
WTO/GAT7 PRACTICE
Neither the WTO treaty texts nor the elaboration of the necessity test by the pre-WTO GATT panels cited above offer much guidance as to how the necessity and least restrictive means requirements
are to be implemented in practice. For example, what does it mean to
say that an alternative measure is "reasonably available," or that a
party can "reasonably be expected" to employ it? How does one determine whether a measure is more trade restrictive than required,
"taking into account technical and economic feasibility?" Definitive
interpretations of each instance of the necessity and least restrictive
means tests in WTO law are not yet available, but the WTO decisions
to date strongly suggest that cost-benefit logic lies at the center of
analysis. I begin with a summary of all the pertinent decisions and
conclude with a discussion of their implications.
A.

WTO Decisions
1. Korea-Beef.

The Korean beef dispute involved a number of Korean regulations that affected the sale of imported beef. One of the challenged
regulations was the "dual retail system" for the sale of domestic and
imported beef, which required that small stores carry either only domestic or imported beef (although they could choose which), while
large stores had to sell imported and domestic beef in different sections of the store. The Panel found that the regulation violated
Korea's nondiscrimination obligations under WTO law, and that it
was not protected by the Article XX(d) exception to those obligations.1' Both findings were appealed but only the latter issue
concerns us here.
Korea defended the regulation under Article XX(d)5 on the
grounds that it was necessary to protect consumers against fraudulent
practices condemned by its Unfair Competition Act, a "law ...not in14 WTO, Korea-MeasuresAffecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, Report of
the Appellate Body, 186, WT/DS161 & 169/AB/R (Jan 10, 2001) (upholding the
Panel's conclusions that "Korea's dual retail system for beef is inconsistent with Article III:4
of the GATT
1994" and "is not justified under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994"). This and
all other WTO
decisions are online at http://www.wto.org.
15 "[Njothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures... necessary to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement." Reprinted
in Jackson,
Davey, and Sykes, Document Supplement at 45 (cited in note 4).
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consistent with the provisions of [GATT]" as contemplated by Article
XX(d). 6 Korea argued that its domestic beef was generally of higher
quality, and was much more costly, than imported beef. The record in
the case indeed seemed to suggest that Korean consumers would pay
a premium for the domestic product. As a result, retailers had an incentive to pass off imported beef as domestic beef, and the dual retail
system was said to be "necessary" to prevent these fraudulent practices. Korea's claim of necessity rested on the proposition that the
dual retail system was more effective at policing fraud than alternatives because it was as an ex ante measure that prevented the commingling of imported and foreign beef that might lead to fraud." It
argued that the alternative to the dual retail system was a system of
ex post enforcement actions that would inevitably fail to catch some
fraudfeasors, and therefore did not guarantee the level of anti-fraud
18
enforcement that Korea had chosen for itself. Further, the alternative of policing shops to check for fraud was infeasible, because Korea
"lacks the resources necessary to police thousands of shops on a
round-the-clock basis." 9
In considering Korea's arguments, the Appellate Body accepted
the proposition that those laws were of the sort contemplated by Article XX(d), and focused its attention on its necessity test." It sug-

gested that "the term 'necessary' refers ... to a range of degrees of

necessity.... [A] 'necessary' measure is, in this continuum, located
than to the opposite
significantly closer to the pole of 'indispensable'
to.' 2
pole of simply 'making a contribution
[A] determination of whether a measure, which is not 'indispensable', may nevertheless be 'necessary' within the contemplation
of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing
and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the
contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the
common interests or values protected by that law or regulation,
and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports. =
Applying this test, the Appellate Body found it instructive that
dual retail systems had not been employed with respect to other
products, where a similar risk of consumer confusion might arise, and
Korea-Beefat
17 See id at 1 175.
18 See id.
19 Id.
20 See id at 158.
21 Id at T 161.
Id at 164.
22
16

25 (cited in note 14).
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it had not been applied to restaurants where 45 percent of all beef
was sold. It was "not persuaded that Korea could not achieve its desired level of enforcement" by devoting "more resources" to conventional enforcement efforts in the beef sector.N "Violations of laws
and regulations like the Korean Unfair Competition Act can be expected to be routinely investigated and detected through selective,
but well-targeted, controls of potential wrongdoers." ' Finally, even
though alternative enforcement measures "could well entail higher
enforcement costs for the national budget," the alternative Korea had
chosen had "in effect shifted all, or the great bulk, of these potential
costs ... to imported goods and retailers of imported goods," an "on-

erous shifting of enforcement costs which ordinarily are borne by the
Member's public purse."2' Accordingly, the Appellate Body affirmed
the finding that the dual retail system was not "necessary."27
2. EC-Asbestos.

The asbestos dispute arose when France enacted a ban on the
sale of virtually all products containing asbestos in any form. Canadian firms had previously produced and exported to France various
products for the construction industry, such as concrete forms reinforced with an asbestos-containing fiber. The French regulation put an
end to these exports, and Canada complained that this policy violated
VTO nondiscrimination obligations as well as obligations to eschew
the use of quantitative restrictions on international trade." A dispute
panel agreed with Canada that a violation of these obligations was
present, but held that the Article XX(b) ° exception for measures
necessary to protect human health was applicable to the ban so that
no ultimate violation of WTO law arose.
On appeal, Canada challenged the panel's reliance on Article
XX(b), contending in particular that a total ban on asbestoscontaining articles was not "necessary" to the protection of human
Seeid at 168.
Id at 1 180.
25 Id.
26
Id at 181.
27
See id at 1 182.
28 WTO, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing
Products,Report of the Appellate Body, 1 2, 193, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar 12, 2001)
("Canada
has not succeeded in establishing that the [asbestos] measure at issue is inconsistent with
the obligations of the European Communities under the covered agreements.").
29
See id at T 2-3.
30
"[Nlothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures ... necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life
or health." Reprinted in Jackson, Davey, and Sykes, Document Supplement at 45 (cited
in note
4).
31 See EC-Asbestos at I 4(d) (cited in note 28).
23

24
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health. 32 In this regard it raised four arguments: (1) that the panel
erred in finding that the asbestos-containing products created some
health risk; (2) that the panel could not find that a measure was protected by Article XX(b) unless it had a quantitative estimate of the
magnitude of the risk that it avoided; (3) that the panel inappropriately characterized the regulatory objective as being a complete halt
to the spread of asbestos-related health risks, as it failed to take account of the fact that substitute products also created health risks; and
(4) that the panel erred in finding that the "controlled use" of asbes3
tos-containing products was not a reasonably available alternative.
The first two arguments are of little interest here and were dispensed with easily by the Appellate Body-the challenge to the finding of a health risk was a challenge to a basic factual finding that
would not be disturbed on appeal, and the suggestion that the risk
must be quantified finds no textual support in Article XX or in prior
cases.' The third and fourth arguments, by contrast, raise more fundamental issues and require somewhat greater attention.
Canada's third argument was, in effect, that France had established a risk baseline that tolerated some health risk from construction products like those at issue. Hence, the panel should have asked
whether some less restrictive policy could have achieved the same
level of overall health risk as the situation that prevailed after the ban
on asbestos-containing products. The panel, by contrast, had found
that France's goal was to achieve zero risk from asbestos, and that it
was accordingly "necessary" to ban asbestos-containing goods altogether. The analysis suggested by Canada would have been challenging to be sure-it would have required a determination as to the
overall health risk associated with substitute products with the ban in
place, and an analysis of whether alternatives to a ban on asbestoscontaining products could achieve a comparable risk level.
The Appellate Body's response is somewhat opaque," but seemingly amounts to the proposition that in a case such as this one, least
restrictive means analysis will not restate the regulatory goal pro32
33

34
35

See id at
See id.

165.

166-67.
See id at
The Appellate Body stated:

[Ilt is undisputed that WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection of
health that they consider appropriate in a given situation. France has determined, and the
Panel accepted, that the chosen level of health protection ... is a 'halt' to the spread of asbestos-relatedhealth risks... Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that [substitute] fibres might pose a risk to health. The scientific evidence before the Panel indicated that the
risk posed by the [substitute] fibres is, in any case, less than the risk posed by ... asbestos
fibres.
Id at

168.
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pounded by a WTO member. If the stated goal is zero risk from asbestos, then WTO law merely inquires whether the measure in question
is necessary to that goal, even if the overall level of health risk is not
zero due to the risks from substitutes, and even if some less restrictive
alternative policy arguably could achieve a comparable overall level
of risk. The implicit constraint is merely that the regulatory policy in
question cannot exacerbate the risk in relation to the alternativesthe substitutes cannot create more risk than the products they supplant.i' Regarding Canada's fourth argument about the "controlled
use" of asbestos products as a less restrictive alternative, the Appellate Body again addressed the question left open by some of the earlier GATT decisions-what does it mean to say that an alternative is
"reasonably available"? It referred briefly to an earlier panel
finding
that had not been appealed to the effect that "an alternative measure
did not cease to be 'reasonably' available simply because the alternative measure involved administrativedifficulties."37 It then quoted its

opinion in the Korean beef case regarding the factors relevant to the
"weighing and balancing process," and concluded
that:
In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation of human life and health .... The value pursued is both vital and important in the highest degree. The remaining question,
then, is whether there is an alternative measure that would
achieve the same end."
The last step was to point to scientific evidence in the record to the effect that "controlled use" (such as ensuring that the demolition of
buildings with the asbestos-containing products are conducted by personnel wearing protection from airborne asbestos fibers) was not perfect."
Some risks of asbestos exposure would always remain, and
hence controlled
use would not achieve the stated health objective. °
3. EC-Hormones.

In the 1980s, European regulators decided that the administration of growth hormones to beef cattle creates some human health
risk (primarily a risk of cancer), even though scientific evidence of the
risk from small residues was scant at best for most of the hormones in
question. Europe prohibited the use of growth hormones on cattle for
human consumption in Europe, and also prohibited the importation
of beef from other nations that do not ban the use of growth hor36
37
38

39
40

See note 35.
Id atJ 169.
Id at 172.
See id at 174.
See id.
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mones. As a result, a number of exporting nations, including the
United States and Canada, were no longer able to sell their beef in
Europe. (The option of certifying beef as hormone-free to the satisfaction of European regulators was evidently uneconomical.) The dispute simmered for many years, and was quickly brought to the WTO
after its formation" pursuant to the new Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures which, as noted earlier,
requires Europe to ensure, inter alia, that its food safety regulations
are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve its legitimate
regulatory objectives.
I note the case not for what it says on this issue, but for what it
does not say. Although Europe lost the case on other grounds, the parties to the case did not even raise the least restrictive means issue, despite obvious arguments that might have been made in that regard.
Europe had characterized its regulation as a "zero residue" policy. But
rather than understanding the goal as a zero residue objective, it
could have been recharacterized as a zero risk objective. Evidence
might then be adduced to establish that zero risk is achieved at low
level residues (such as those permitted under hormone-residue standards promulgated by international standardization bodies), and a
regulatory policy tolerating that level of residue might be deemed a
less restrictive alternative. As another possibility, perhaps the regulatory objective could be restated as one of ensuring that consumers are
protected against unwitting ingestion of hormone residues that they
might prefer to avoid. Then, perhaps a labeling requirement for hormone-raised beef might be a less restrictive alternative. Yet, these
strategies were not pursued at all. One must be cautious in drawing an
inference about the law from the fact that litigants did not raise an argument, but the fact that attorneys for the United States opted not to
pursue least restrictive means arguments surely suggests that they saw
little hope for them on these facts.
GATT Decisions

B.

Before discussing the implications of the WTO cases, it is useful
to note briefly how the "necessity" issue was resolved in practice by
pre-WTO GATT panels.

See WTO, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of
the Appellate Body, 11 1, 253, WT/DS/26 & 48/ABJR (Jan 16, 1998) (upholding "the Panel's
finding that the EC measures at issue are inconsistent with the requirements of Article 5.1 of
the SPS Agreement").
41
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1. United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930.

Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 provides for actions before the International Trade Commission when the importation of articles involves unfair methods of competition. 2 It has primarily been
invoked in patent disputes. 3 The European Community challenged a
prior version of the law as a violation of the nondiscrimination obligations of GATI'." The premise of the challenge was that domestic patent infringers could only be sued in U.S. courts, while the producers of
imported goods that were alleged to infringe U.S. patents could either
be sued in a court proceeding or subjected to an action under Section
337, which differed with regard to the time frame for the action, the
procedures, and the remedies available.4'5 For example, the remedy in
court was either damages or injunction, while the remedy under Section 337 included the possibility of an order directing the Customs
Service to bar the offending goods from entering the United States.'
The dispute panel found that impermissible discrimination was
indeed present, and proceeded to consider whether the United States
had a defense under Article XX(d), treating the patent laws generally
as "laws ...not inconsistent with [GAT]. " ' 7 By and large, the features of Section 337 that might disadvantage respondents relative to
an action in U.S. court were held not to be "necessary" to the enforcement of the patent laws. The fact that Section 337 cases proceed much more quickly, for example, could not be justified as essential to the enforcement of the law-if speed
was essential, why only
49
when the infringing goods were imported?
The only feature of Section 337 that the panel felt might be "necessary" was the in rem remedy, and the opportunity for orders to be
issued to the Customs Service to exclude offending goods.'O The panel
reasoned that in personam remedies might be ignored or evaded by
foreign producers who were not subject to arrest in the United States
and might have no assets to be seized by U.S. authorities.' The only
viable option for preventing the sale of infringing goods, therefore,
might be to exclude them from U.S. markets.52

See United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930 at 1 2.2 (cited in note 6).
See id.
44 Idat 1.3.
45 See id at 1 2.8.
46 See id at 2.8(I).
47 Id at 1 5.22.
48
See id at I T 5.28-5.30.
49
See id.
50
See id at 1 5.31-5.33.
51 See id.
52
See id.
42

43
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2. Thailand- Cigarettes.
Thailand engaged in a number of regulatory practices that disadvantaged foreign sellers of cigarettes. Most prominently, Thailand required import licenses to be issued before cigarettes could be imported, and allegedly had refused to issue any such licenses for a decade."
Thailand defended its practices on two grounds. First, it argued
that the government was concerned about the adverse health impact
from the growing use of cigarettes by the Thai population.4 Second, it
argued that imported cigarettes contained certain additional chemicals, such as those designed to lower tar and nicotine content, that
might pose a health risk." Both arguments were claimed to afford a
XX(d).6
defense to the challenged practices under GATT Article
The panel ruled that the discriminatory treatment of imported
cigarettes could not possibly be "necessary" to the goal of curtailing
smoking." It noted that a number of nondiscriminatory alternatives
could be employed to that end-measures that raise the prices of all
cigarettes uniformly, for example, or that restrict advertising uniformly." Regarding the argument that imported cigarettes contained
potentially dangerous chemicals or additives, the panel also concluded
that an outright ban on imports was not "necessary" to address the
problem." It suggested that Thailand could simply ban cigarettes containing specific additives that were dangerous or unhealthy, and as to
other additives it could employ nondiscriminatory labeling requirements that ensured disclosure to the consumer.6
3. United States- Marine Mammal ProtectionAct
(Tuna-Dolphin).
The Tuna-Dolphincase involved, among other things, a U.S. statute that prohibited the importation of tuna caught using certain fishing methods that kill dolphins.6' The statute applied to all tuna imports, even if the fish were caught in international waters or in the ter-

53 See Thailand- Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes at
6
(cited in note 7).
54 Seeidat
21.
55 See id at 28.
56
See id at 11 21,28.
57 Seeid at 181.
58
See id at 1$ 78-80.
59 See id at 9177.
60 See id.
61 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 39th Supp GATT BISD 155, 1 2.5, 7.1
(1993) (not adopted) (concluding that the "prohibition of imports of certain yellowfin tuna...
and the provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act under which it is imposed are
contrary to Article XI:1 and are not justified by Article XX(b) or Article XX(g)").
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ritorial waters of another nation. It was challenged as a violation of
GATT nondiscrimination obligations, or alternatively as a violation of
GATT commitments regarding quantitative restrictions.? In a report
that was never adopted in the GATT and that accordingly never became binding, the Panel found violations of GATT commitments and
proceeded to consider whether the United States could invoke an Article XX exception.?
Among other things, the United States argued that its policy was
"necessary" to protect animal health under Article XX(b).4 Much of
the discussion on this point centered on whether the United States
could invoke Article XX(b) with respect to animals outside of its jurisdiction, but the report also contained some discussion of the "necessity" test.? In particular, the panel noted that one important and
highly trade-restrictive feature of U.S. law did not appear to be "necessary":
The United States linked the maximum incidental dolphin taking
rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular period in order to be able to export tuna to the United States to the taking
rate actually recorded for United States fisherman during the
same period. Consequently, the Mexican authorities could not
know whether, at a given point in time, their policies conformed
to the United States's dolphin protection standards.6
In addition, the panel held that the United States had not shown that
it had exhausted other avenues for the protection of dolphins, "in particular through the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements, which would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of many states and the high seas."'67
C. Implications
Although the number of cases over the history of the
WTO/GATT system applying a least restrictive means test is small,
the cases to date are consistent in my view with the proposition that
the test is a crude form of cost-benefit balancing that is highly attentive to error costs and uncertainty. By "crude," I mean that the WTO
decisionmaker does not actually quantify the costs and benefits of alternative regulatory policies in dollars or some other metric. Rather,
the decisionmaker proceeds more impressionistically and qualitaIdat 13.1.
See id at 1 5.18,5.23.
64 Idat1 5.24.
65 See id at 1 5.25.
66 Idat 15.28.
67 Id.
62
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tively to assess the effect of alternative policies on trade, the administrative difficulties and resource costs associated with alternative policies, and the regulatory efficacy of those policies. It then weighs these
considerations in making a decision.
The attention to error costs and uncertainty is evident in the
hesitancy of decisionmakers to hold that an alternative is less restrictive (or that the challenged policy is not "necessary") if the alternative policy may be less efficacious and if the value of regulatory efficacy is great. Thus, for example, if the regulatory objective relates to
some highly valued interest such as the protection of human life, then
the challenged regulation will be upheld if there is any doubt as to the
ability of the proposed alternative to achieve the same level of efficacy. This practice may be understood as a recognition of the fact that
the costs of an erroneous decision-loss of life-would be extremely

high, and that even a small probability of an erroneous decision counsels against condemning the measure under scrutiny.
By contrast, where the regulatory objective relates to some less
important interest, and the proposed alternative is considerably less
restrictive of trade, decisionmakers can condemn a challenged regulation even when the efficacy of the proposed alternative regulation
may be less than the efficacy of the challenged regulation. Likewise,
where an alternative regulation is clearly less restrictive of trade and
there is no doubt as to its efficacy in achieving regulatory goals, the
mere fact that it is somewhat more costly for regulators to implement
will not prevent the decisionmaker from condemning the challenged
regulation. These last observations make clear that the "narrow" conditions set forth in the introduction to this Essay need not hold before
a less restrictive alternative may be found, and further indicate that
an important degree of (crude) cost-benefit balancing is involved in
the analysis.
Each of the adopted decisions to date fits nicely within this
framework. In Korea-Beef, the dual retail system may well have

made it easier for regulators to prevent the passing off of imported
meat for domestic meat. Korea argued that before the system was put
in place, fraud was difficult to police because once beef was unpacked
it was largely impossible to determine its origin. Likewise, the alternative of trying to police fraud through spot inspections may have been
more expensive. Nevertheless, in the face of evidence that the dual retail system had constrained the number of outlets for the imported
product and significantly reduced its sales, the policing method that
Korea employed to deal with other forms of consumer fraud was
deemed less restrictive. The result may be explained by the fact that
the cost of fraud to consumers-unwitting consumption of imported
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rather than domestic beef-was clearly modest at best. Any reduction
in the efficacy of regulation was thus of little moment.
In EC-Asbestos, Canada argued forcefully that asbestos was of
no danger unless airborne, and that carefully "controlled use" of its
construction products with embedded asbestos fibers would protect
against any hazard. The market should decide whether the extra costs
of controlled use were worth incurring. But the European response
that the absolute efficacy of controlled use had not been established
in all settings, and that the products might fall into the hands of individuals who did not follow sound "controlled use" guidelines, carried
the day. It was enough that the proposed alternative might not be as
effective as a complete ban on the products, and that the health hazard was real. Likewise, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body
would accept Canada's attempt to recharacterize the regulatory objective as some (non-zero) overall level of health risk based on the
risks that France would apparently tolerate from substitute products.
To do so would have embroiled them in an error-fraught task of trying
to determine whether the residual hazard with controlled use was less
than or greater than the hazards from substitutes.
Given the decision in EC-Asbestos, it seems that attorneys for
the United States in EC-Hormones were right to eschew least restrictive means arguments. They too would have rested on an attempt
to recharacterize the regulatory objective in Europe as zero risk
rather than zero residue, or perhaps as informed choice. Considering
the health risk at stake, any serious possibility that positive hormone
residues create a health hazard would almost certainly have prevented a finding that international residue standards or labeling requirements were a less restrictive alternative. The only realistic hope
for the United States, therefore, was to show that the zero residue
standard was completely unjustified from a scientific standpoint, and
violated a different requirement in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Agreement-a requirement that measures be based on a
scientific risk assessment.6' Success on that front would make the
least restrictive means argument superfluous, while failure on that
front would surely have doomed the least restrictive means analysis
as well.
Although the old GATT cases are not legally "binding" in the
WTO, at least the adopted panel reports from GATT have some persuasive authority. It is instructive to note that the results in these early
68 For more on the hormones case and the role of scientific evidence requirements in
WTO law, see Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 Chi J Intl L 353, 358-61 (2002) (discussing the Appellate
Body's analysis in ruling that the European prohibition of meat products from cattle raised with
growth hormones violated the scientific evidence requirement).
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cases comport with the approach of the WTO cases-indeed, they are
for the most part extremely easy cases in which the existence of less
restrictive alternatives could hardly be contested under any standard.
In US.-Section 337, it was impossible to explain why most of the
rules that discriminated against foreign firms alleged to have infringed U.S. patents contributed to any legitimate regulatory objective. A fortiori, nondiscriminatory alternatives were less restrictive.
The one exception-in rem remedies-had no plausible substitute in
cases where the foreign infringer could not be reached personally due
to the absence of any physical or financial presence in the United
States. And it was difficult to imagine how an in rem measure at the
border could be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis to domestic
goods.
Thailand- Cigarettes is similar in important respects. The
discriminatory treatment of imported goods was not plausibly needed
if the goal was to reduce smoking. Indeed, measures that raised the
price or restricted the quantity of imports but not domestic substitutes are plainly inferior to measures that raise price or restrict quantity across the board. As for the purported health concerns of the Thai
government about the additives in foreign cigarettes, Thailand was
free to enact a nondiscriminatory ban on cigarettes containing any
additive that was thought to pose a health hazard, and to require disclosure of all additives. Even though health concerns were at issue,
therefore, there seemed to be no uncertainty about the adequacy of
trade neutral measures to take care of them.
Tuna-Dolphin, the one unadopted decision noted here, also involved a practice that had no plausible justification as an animal
health measure -a regulation that conditioned the right to import on
an incidental dolphin kill requirement that was only revealed after
foreign fishermen had landed their catch. Whatever the permissible
threat to dolphins, there was no reason why it could not be specified
in advance. The one dimension of the case that is rather unusual is the
suggestion that prior negotiation to achieve a cooperative solution
was needed before the United States could unilaterally require other
nations to comply with its dolphin protection policy as a condition of
69
the right to export to the United States. Without more details on the
69 This idea resurfaced in a more recent WTO case, albeit not in the context of a least restrictive means analysis. See United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
172, 187, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov 6, 1998) (stating
Products,Report of the Appellate Body,
that "the failure of the United States to pursue negotiations for establishing consensual means
of protection and conservation of the living marine resources here involved" rose to the level of
"unjustifiable discrimination"; and concluding that the United States protective measure was
"not justified under Article XX of the GAT[ 1994"). This case involved measures to protect sea
turtles, prohibiting shrimp imports from nations that used shrimping methods deemed unsafe for
the turtle population by the United States. The Panel and the Appellate Body found that the
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contours of such a requirement-how long must negotiation be given
to succeed, what if other nations do not give in to U.S. demands, and
so on-it is difficult to know whether this requirement is onerous or
trivial, and thus difficult to evaluate its relationship to the framework
developed here.
The reader may complain that I have given too little attention to
competing hypotheses. The most obvious alternative might be the hypothesis that least restrictive means analysis in the WTO is political
cover for motive review-that its real function is to identify policies
motivated by protectionism rather than by some legitimate, nonprotectionist objective. A similar suggestion has been advanced with
reference to the cases decided under the dormant Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution."
Undeniably, at least some of the cases discussed above could be
viewed as consistent with this hypothesis as well. But without going
on at length, I reject it because the WTO has shown itself more than
willing to condemn practices that have clear nonprotectionist origins
(as in the EC-Hormones case"). There is little reason to think that
least restrictive means analysis is more cabined in this respect than
other inquiries under WTO law. Nevertheless, an ideal test case for
discriminating among these hypotheses remains to be decided.
CONCLUSION

This Essay has argued that least restrictive means analysis in the
WTO/GATT system to date is roughly co-extensive with (crude) costbenefit analysis. The analysis gives great weight to the presence of uncertainty about the efficacy of regulatory alternatives when a vital interest like human health is genuinely at stake, but this feature too
comports with the logic of cost-benefit analysis under uncertainty. It is
an open question whether least restrictive means analysis works similarly in other legal contexts. One suspects that it does, but systematic
exploration of that issue remains for future research.

United States had negotiated agreements regarding the protection of sea turtles with some nations but had made no attempt to negotiate them with others, and thus engaged in"unjustifiable
discrimination" in violation of the chapeau to Article XX. See id at 11 166-72.
70 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich L Rev 1091, 1206-84 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme
Court, in its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, has been concerned exclusively with
preventing state protectionism).
71 The regulations in question there were promulgated after well-publicized incidents in
which the ingestion of beef from cattle treated with the hormone DES produced some nasty
health issues. See Sykes, Product Standards at 16-17 (cited in note 2).

